We discuss the infection control and public health measures taken whilst managing a case of laboratory confirmed rabies and the challenges faced in implementing these measures. Case management requires intensive multi-disciplinary coordination. The Milwaukee protocol, which to date has 5 reported human rabies survivors associated with its use, has been suggested as a potential management pathway for human rabies. A consensus among hospital and public health clinicians would aid future deployment of this approach in selected cases.
INTRODUCTION
Rabies is a viral illness causing an encephalitis that is almost always fatal. Belonging to the Rhabdoviridae and of the Lyssavirus genus, rabies is a significant cause of mortality in the developing world. Transmission to humans usually occurs via the salivary route as a result of a bite from an infected animal. Dogs account for the majority of cases of animal rabies (54%), although bats are increasingly becoming the source of human rabies in the United States. In the United Kingdom (UK), rabies has been eradicated amongst the terrestrial animal population and therefore recent cases of transmission to humans from terrestrial animals have been associated with exposure whilst abroad. Bats in the UK, however, do carry lyssaviruses thus posing a risk for human rabies acquisition 1 . European bat lyssavirus type 1 (EBVL-1) is the predominant strain circulating amongst bats in Europe 2 . However, within the UK, only cases of EBLV-2 infection have been identified in the bat population 2 
. The
Daubenton's bat (Myotis daubentonii) is the only bat species in the UK in which EBLV-2 has been isolated 2 and in 2002, an unvaccinated bat handler in Scotland who did not receive rabies post-exposure prophylaxis, died from a laboratoryconfirmed EBLV-2 infection 3 . Bat bites are typically less conspicuous than those from terrestrial animals and therefore specialist advice should be promptly sought if a bat bite is felt by an individual, regardless of whether a skin break is visible and irrespective of whether the bat species is known 1 .
The incubation period following exposure to rabies has been reported to be as long as 19 years although most individuals will become unwell within 90 days of exposure.
Initial symptoms are non-specific and include fever, malaise, headache, nausea and vomiting. This prodromal period lasts between 2 and 10 days. Subsequently, infected individuals develop agitation, delirium, hydrophobia and autonomic dysfunction.
Ultimately coma and death occur from cerebral oedema or myocarditis.
Early recognition and timely management of exposures protects patients from this fatal viral infection. Where this has failed to prevent disease, caring for patients with suspected and/or confirmed rabies, a Hazard Group 3 (HG3) pathogen, poses a major challenge. Following the survival of a patient 4 , the Milwaukee protocol has been suggested as a potential clinical algorithm. However, a co-ordinated approach both between and within relevant organisations is required with early laboratory confirmation in order to avoid exposure of others including health care workers. It is important that preparation and rehearsal of pre-incident planning takes place and that protocols are followed.
We describe the infection control and public health management implications of the Milwaukee protocol in a case of rabies. The patient presented to a District General Hospital and was subsequently managed in partial concordance with the Milwaukee protocol in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of a London teaching hospital.
METHODS

Setting
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital located is a District General Hospital in South East In the UK, Public Health England provides 24-hour advice regarding management of cases of public health interest.
Summary of the case
The infectious diseases doctor on-call for the HTD received a call from the Emergency department of Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Woolwich referring a 58-yearold patient with suspected rabies 4. Nine weeks prior to her presentation our patient had sustained a bite by an ownerless puppy to her right forearm whilst in India. She was accepted for transfer to UCLH and admitted directly to the ICU at UCLH the same day. Treatment of the patient was principally guided by the Milwaukee protocol version 3.1 (which is now in its most updated form as version 5.0) 5 . The protocol is based on induced coma and neurotransmitter substrate replenishment, whilst allowing the body's immune system to clear the virus and aims at rebalancing the rabies-induced tetrahyrobiopterin deficiency that leads to dopamine and serotonin deficiency and poor nitric oxidase activity 6 . We were also guided in the infection prevention and control aspects of our case management by the current Department 
RESULTS
INFECTION CONTROL MEASURES
Initial Management at the referring hospital
A diagnosis of rabies was suspected by the patient's GP who had a telephone discussion with the emergency medicine consultant at Queen Elizabeth Hospital.
The case was subsequently discussed with the microbiology consultant, who alerted Public Health England. Strict infection control precautions were advised and followed.
The patient was cared for by a small team of charge nurses and consultants in order minimise exposure. There were no direct exposures to the patient's bodily secretions without personal protective equipment as strict contact precautions were followed from the outset. Post exposure vaccination was offered to 6 members of staff of Queen Elizabeth Hospital, two of whom completed the full 5 doses course. The other 4 staff members opted not to receive the vaccine.
The patient and members of staff at UCLH:
The patient was admitted to a single-bed room with en-suite sanitary facilities, a lobby and negative pressure ventilation on the ICU. Urine and faeces from the patient, although considered non-infectious, were disposed of in an en-suite toilet and any residual matter was put in the clinical waste. Prior to intubation the patient was drooling and producing a significant amount of salivary secretions which were considered infectious. Once intubated, a closed suction catheter system was used for removal of tracheal secretions. Suction containers were disposed of in the clinical waste and subsequently transported away from the clinical area to undergo incineration. Single-use equipment was used as much as possible and discarded in the infectious waste stream. Chlorine dioxide-based disinfectant was used to clean non-disposable equipment. Chlorine-based disinfectants are effective against the rabies virus and thus can be used for chemical disinfection procedures in cases such as ours 7 . Rabies is an enveloped virus with a lipid-containing bilayer thus rendering it susceptible to many commonly used disinfectants including iodine preparations, quaternary ammonium compounds, detergents and other lipid solvents 8 .
Visitors and staff entering the room were required to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) consisting of face masks with integral visors for eye protection, gowns and gloves. Standard surgical masks do not provide adequate levels of protection against potential mucocutaneous exposure 7 . The number of people visiting the patient was kept to a minimum. Family members were able to visit with prearrangement, wearing PPE as described, one person at a time (with a health care worker present in the room). Family members were not permitted to be in the room whilst any procedures were being performed on our patient. A single, domestic cleaner, who had been specifically advised on rabies exposure avoidance measures, cleaned the room daily again using disposable equipment where possible and wearing PPE. Table 1 The UCLH laboratory:
Investigations
The specimens (nuchal skin biopsy, wound biopsy and saliva) obtained on day 1 were initially received in the UCLH Virology laboratory. After giving prior notification, the samples were urgently couriered to the reference laboratory (Veterinary Laboratories Agency) in an appropriately labelled and packed secure metal box following advice for Transportation of Category A Dangerous Goods 12 . Table 3 summarises the precautions taken at UCLH with regards to transporting, processing and the disposal of patient specimens collected. Table 3 . Infection control measures taken for processing of specimens. This information was circulated in the form of a trust rabies case management document to pathology staff critical care staff, infection doctors, infection control doctors and nurses Infection control measures taken with our rabies patient's specimens
All specimens
Prior notification of the laboratory and discussion with a senior member of laboratory staff Ward staff to contact courier to transport specimens to laboratory Transported in designated metal high risk containment tin
Taken to the relevant laboratory specimen reception "High Risk" sticker placed on all specimens at time of booking onto the UCLH laboratory system Standard precautions followed for sample handling within the laboratory Waste material/specimens retrieved by a designated biomedical scientist, double-bagged and autoclaved prior to disposal
Virology specimens
Prior discussion with virology consultant Couriered directly to the reference laboratory
Microbiology specimens
Prior discussion with microbiology consultant
Haematology specimens
Analysed in a closed system (as normal)
Biochemistry specimens
Centrifugation of samples in the specimen reception area
Handling of samples for routine care in Haematology, Biochemistry and Bacteriology was discussed with the laboratories involved. As secretions (saliva, tracheal aspirates, CSF, urine) may contain the virus, such samples were collected only if necessary and with prior arrangement with the laboratories. Processing of routine bloods was carried out on automated platforms (blood is considered non-infectious).
Our patient did not require respiratory investigations.
Public Health Management
In accordance with Public Health England's guidance on management of a suspected cases of human rabies, our highly suspected case of rabies required a response level 3, consisting of case management input from multiple organisations 13 .
Public Health England was notified on suspicion by the referring hospital and daily teleconferences were held to provide updates and advice on further management of our patient.
DISCUSSION
Management of a patient with rabies poses a major challenge and requires a health care facility that is able to support the augmented care needs of such a patient.
Effective communication between healthcare professionals in primary care, secondary care and public health is vital. As described, strict infection control precautions are needed whilst following the Milwaukee protocol and this requires close coordination between several departments and their staff within a hospital.
To date, nosocomial transmission has been limited to solid organ and tissue transplant recipients 14 with no reported acquisition of rabies infection in healthcare workers caring for a patient infected with rabies 15 . There have been 8 documented patient deaths associated with receiving corneal transplants from rabies infected donors 13 . Another patient, however, that promptly received the rabies inactivated vaccine post-operatively on day one, survived after receiving a corneal transplant from a confirmed rabies-infected donor 14, 16 . A child that died from canine rabies in the in Democratic of Congo bit two of his relatives whilst unwell 17 . Both relatives received rabies PEP on time and did not develop rabies. In contrast, a patient in China died from laboratory-confirmed rabies after broken skin on his hand (covered by gauze) came into contact with the blood of his relative that he was helping immediately after his relative was bitten by a stray dog 18 . The patient did not seek further medical attention at the time or receive rabies vaccination whereas his relative that suffered the dog bite promptly received the rabies vaccine and survived without complications. The potential consequences of nosocomial rabies transmission are extremely high and its Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) classification as a Hazard Group 3 pathogen means that strict precautions are required.
As typically occurs in the natural history of human rabies, our patient in the early part of her admission was hydrophobic, became extremely agitated and had a violent episode prior to being anaesthetised, intubated and ventilated 4 . Caring for a patient during this stage poses a heightened risk and therefore strict precautions must be taken with regards to PPE, infection controls and sampling (which should be limited to where necessary).
We were guided by the Milwaukee protocol throughout the care of our patient and closely followed it particularly where we felt it was likely to alter management. We opted not to follow certain parts where we did not think it was likely to have a significant impact on the management of the patient thus minimising potential healthcare worker exposure. Despite efforts from the outset to minimise the number of staff exposed to our patient and her specimens, the complexity of managing a case of rabies and following the Milwaukee pathway meant that 59 UCLH staff over the 10-day admission period still had some form of exposure albeit low risk in this case. There remains a potential theoretical risk of transmission to exposed healthcare workers and therefore we did our utmost to ensure timely vaccination of individuals reporting an exposure, who opted to receive the vaccine. The criteria for offering vaccination to healthcare workers was broad with a low threshold for offering the rabies vaccine. The prompt, cautious and highly coordinated approach taken in our case with regards to infection control both in the clinical and laboratory setting meant that there no exposures deemed to be significant/type III exposures on risk assessment. Twenty-nine percent of healthcare workers received the rabies vaccination and in other previous hospitalised rabies cases reported healthcare worker vaccination rates have ranged from 2% to 100% 20 . Comprehensive education and prompt handling of any queries by our infection doctors, infection control and occupational health teams with additional support from Public Health England meant that the majority (71%) of healthcare workers did not receive the rabies vaccine in our case. Establishing a 24-hour vaccine advice and provision service for all potential contacts did however pose a significant challenge. There was a significant time commitment from the staff involved over the patient's 10 day hospital admission and further arrangements had to be made for the healthcare workers being vaccinated to return to the occupational health department on specific days that were in concordance with the recommended vaccine dose administration schedule. Adopting a reassurance and counselling strategy with the offer of vaccine only for type III exposure may be a consideration in future cases.
Widespread uncertainty remains regarding the clinical, laboratory and public health infection control implications of following the Milwaukee protocol. We look forward to published analysis of outcomes for all cases managed globally with this intervention.
In the future, we hope for evidence to support a consensus for adopting the protocol when caring for certain patients rather than for all human rabies cases. Regardless, care for these patients can put healthcare workers at significant risk and therefore combined multidisciplinary input for safe care is needed. It is therefore vital to seek specialist advice early and liaise with experts daily for diagnosis, management and infection prevention strategies when managing a case of human rabies. In addition to early specialist advice and daily liaison, pre-incident preparation of clinical, laboratory, transport and cleaning protocols and training therein are needed.
Additional useful guidance for devising local protocols and managing a rabies case includes the World Health Organisation European Rabies bulletin 21 
